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CONUNDRUMS AND PROSPECTS 
T. Alexander Aleinikoff* 
Last November, the people of Puerto Rico went to the polls 
to indicate their preference on the political status of the island 
and its relationship to the United States. With almost three-
quarters of registered voters participating, the plebescite pro-
duced inconclusive results. Just over 48% of the voters selected 
retention of commonwealth status, 46% preferred statehood, and 
5% chose the independence option. The status question has 
dominated Puerto Rican politics for decades (the major political 
parties on the island are identified by their preferred solution), 
yet has received surprisingly little attention on the mainland. It 
has received virtually no attention in constitutional law treatises, 
casebooks, or courses.t This omission is not a good measure of 
the significance of the issues. If Puerto Rico were to achieve 
statehood, it would be the 25th most populous state in the Union, 
sending two senators and half a dozen representatives to Con-
gress. The island, once proclaimed the "showcase for democ-
racy" and the alternative to Cuban-style socialism, is now the 
American "gateway" to the developing Caribbean basin. 
The constitutional status of Puerto Rico raises complex and 
interesting puzzles. The United States acquired sovereignty over 
the island at the close of the Spanish-American War, and half a 
century later Puerto Rico attained the status of Commonwealth 
(Estado Libre Asociado in Spanish). At the time, it was argued 
that the establishment of Commonwealth represented an act of 
self-determination by the people of Puerto Rico and constituted 
an end to the island's status as a colony of the United States. But 
it is recognized today that Commonwealth-at least in its 1950s 
form-is not a permanent solution to the status question. 
Decolonization of Puerto Rico remains a work in progress. 
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. Thanks to Philip Frickey and Gerald 
Neuman for furthering my education on issues discussed in this essay. 
1. See Hon. Jose A. Cabranes, Puerto Rico and the Constitution, 110 F.R.D. 475, 
477 (1985). 
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Commonwealth was a new and novel form of territorial gov-
ernment. It did not, like earlier home rule arrangements for ter-
ritories, presuppose eventual Puerto Rican statehood; and it was 
seen as responding to Puerto Rico's desires to remain part of the 
United States while retaining a distinct culture and language.z 
Commonwealth raises a host of constitutional questions regard-
ing the continuing scope of federal power over the island and the 
rights of Commonwealth residents (who have been U.S. citizens 
since 1917). Constitutional law ought to find these issues inter-
esting in their own right. But beyond satisfying intellectual curi-
osity, the questions open up broader themes of citizenship, the 
divisibility of sovereignty, and cultural nationalism which are of 
increasing salience in the United States and the world. This es-
say-in this anniversary issue-is an attempt to spark interest in 
these fascinating and important issues of constitutional member-
ship and political sovereignty.J 
2. See Rafael Hernandez Col6n, The Commonwealth of Pueno Rico: Territory or 
State?, 19 Revista del Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico 207, 210 (1959). 
3. I reserve for consideration at a later date the vexing question of who should vote 
on the status question. Some have argued that the 2.5 million Puerto Ricans living on the 
mainland (about 1 million of whom live in New York City) should have been able to vote 
in the November plebescite. Difficulties with defining who is "Puerto Rican" and practi-
cal problems with voting procedures led the Island political parties to limit the referen-
dum to residents of Puerto Rico. In effect, the answer sides with the view of Puerto Rico 
as a "proto-state" rather than an independent nation: voting turns, as it does in state 
elections, on residence, not "nationality." Of course, underlying much of the debate on 
participation by mainland Puerto Ricans were strategic political calculations of how the 
off-Island population would vote. 
Legislation introduced in the 101st Congress would have authorized the government 
of Puerto Rico to enable persons not residing in Puerto Rico to vote in a referendum on 
status if they were born in Puerto Rico or had at least one parent who was born in Puerto 
Rico. H.R. 4765, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1990). Supporters of independence have criti-
cized the refusal to extend voting privileges to mainland Puerto Ricans, declaring that the 
referendum denied these "Puerto Rican nationals" the right to vote, while enfranchising 
"more than 100,000 foreigners with United States citizenship [residing) in Puerto Rico." 
U.N. GAOR Special Comm. on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1422nd 
mtg. at 52, U.N. Doc. A/AC.1091PV.1422 (1993) (statement of Juan Marl Bras); id. at 24 
(statement of Carlos Noriega Rodriguez, President of the Bar Assoc. of Puerto Rico). 
See generally Puerto Rico Self-Determination Act, I990: Hearings on H.R. 4765 Before the 
Subcomm. on Insular and Int'l Affairs of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Af-
fairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1 (1990). See generally Angelo Falc6n, A Divided Nation: 
The Puerto Rican Dfaspora in the United States and the Proposed Referendum, in E. 
Melendez and E. Melendez, eds., Colonial Dilemma: Critical Perspectives on Contempo-
rary Pueno Rico 173-80 (1993). 
Despite neither congressional nor Commonwealth authorization of ~ mai~land vote, 
balloting was organized in New York in October, 1993. Plans for votes m Chicago, New 
Jersey, and elsewhere were ultimately abandoned. 
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The Constitution grants Congress power to make "all need-
ful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory . . . belonging 
to the United States."4 Perhaps the best known construction of 
the Territory Clause is Justice Taney's tortured reasoning in Dred 
Scott, holding that the Clause authorized congressional rule only 
of those territories held by the federal government at the time of 
the founding.s But that reading was inconsistent both with ear-
lier statements of John Marshall and with congressional practice,6 
and was expressly rejected by the Court in the Insular Cases7-a 
set of turn of the century cases which considered the constitu-
tional status of territories acquired after the Spanish-American 
war. It is now well established that Congress possesses plenary 
power to legislate for territories acquired by purchase, conquest, 
treaty, or war.s 
Theoretically, the existence of Congress' plenary power is a 
sword of Damocles hanging over Puerto Rican self-government. 
What Congress has granted, the argument runs, it may always 
take away. The Eleventh Circuit recently stated this position in 
the baldest terms: "Congress may unilaterally repeal the Puerto 
Rican Constitution ... and replace [it] with any rules or regula-
tions of its choice."9 Yet despite the existence of this broad 
power, Congress has granted Puerto Rico increasing degrees of 
home rule. Under the Organic Act of 1900 (the Foraker Act), 
Puerto Rico was ruled by a Governor appointed by the President 
of the United States; the Governor served as commander in chief 
of the militia and had the power to veto legislation adopted by 
the locally elected Legislative Assembly and to appoint lower 
4. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
5. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 438-39, 443 (1856). 
6. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828); Arnold H. Leibo-
witz, Defining Status 140-55 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989). 
7. E.g., Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 142 (1904). 
8. Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308 (1937); Dorr v. United States, 
195 U.S. at 140 (quoting John Marshall's opinion in Sere v. Pitot, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332, 
337 (1810) (recognizing Congress' "absolute and undisputed power of governing and leg-
islating" for territories)). 
9. United States v. Sanchez, 992 F.2d 1143, 1152-53 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that 
"dual sovereignty" doctrine does not apply in case of Puerto Rican and federal prosecu-
tions for the same criminal conduct because "[t]he authority with which Puerto Rico 
brings charges as a prosecuting entity derives from the United States as sovereign"). The 
First Circuit has reached a contrary conclusion. United States v. Lopez Andino, 831 F.2d 
1164 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1034 (1988). 
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courtjudges.lo The 1917 Jones Act extended U.S. citizenship and 
a Bill of Rights to residents of Puerto Rico, and provided for 
popular election of both houses of the legislature. In 1947, Pu-
erto Ricans were granted the right to elect their Governor. 
Three years later, Congress started the process to fuller self-rule 
by adopting "an Act to provide for the organization of a constitu-
tional government by the people of Puerto Rico." The 1950 stat-
ute (Public Law 600) declared: 
Whereas the Congress of the United States by a series of en-
actments has progressively recognized the right of self-
government of the people of Puerto Rico; and 
Whereas under the terms of these congressional enactments 
an increasingly large measure of self-government has 
been achieved: Therefore, 
Be it enacted ... That, fully recognizing the principle of gov-
ernment by consent, this Act is now adopted in the nature of a 
compact so that the people of Puerto Rico may organize a 
government pursuant to a constitution of their own 
adoption. It 
Under the procedures provided by Public Law 600, an island-
wide referendum was held, approving a call for a constitutional 
convention. The draft produced by the convention was adopted 
by the people of Puerto Ricol2 and formally approved by Con-
gress in 1952, with one exceptionB and two provisos.t4 The con-
10. Foraker Act, 31 Stat. 77, §§ 17, 31, 33 (1900) (repealed 1917). Laws enacted by 
the Legislative Assembly could also be annulled by Congress. § 31, 31 Stat. at 83. The 
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico and the upper house of the legislature were appointed by 
the President of the United States. §§ 18, 27, 33, 31 Stat. at 81, 82, 84. 
11. Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 600, ch. 446,64 Stat. 319 (hereinafter Public Law 
600). 
12. Referendum on March 3, 1952: 374,649 to 82,923. Act of July 3, 1952, Pub. L. 
No. 447, ch. 567, 66 Stat. 327. 
13. Congress refused to approve section 20 of Article II of the proposed Constitu-
tion, which provided a list of positive "human rights" such as the rights to obtain work 
and to a standard of living adequate for personal and family well-being, and "the right of 
motherhood and childhood to special care and assistance." 66 Stat. at 327. These guaran-
tees were thought to be incompatible with traditional understandings of a bill of rights. 
14. The provisos required that the Puerto Rican Constitution be amended, first, to 
add the following to the section guaranteeing free and non-sectarian education: "Compul-
sory attendance at elementary public schools to the extent permitted by the facilities of 
the state as herein provided shall not be construed as applicable to those who receive 
elementary education in schools established under nongovernmental auspices." The sec-
ond proviso required the addition of the following to the article establishing an amend-
ment procedure: 
Any amendment or revision of this constitution shall be consistent with the reso-
lution enacted by the Congress of the United States approving this constitution, 
with the applicable provisions of the Constitution of the United States, with the 
Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act, and with Public Law 600, Eighty-first Con-
gress, adopted in the nature of a compact. 
1994] PUERTO RICO 19 
stitutional convention of Puerto Rico acted immediately to 
amend the Constitution as mandated by the Congress, and the 
Constitution of Puerto Rico took effect, after a formal proclama-
tion of the Governor, on July 25, 1952. 
It has been suggested that the establishment of Common-
wealth status ended the Congress' "plenary power" under the 
Territory Clause. Under this reasoning, Congress lost general 
power to regulate the internal affairs of Puerto Rico or to amend 
the "compact" without Puerto Rican consent-much as Congress 
has no power to legislate for the now-independent Philippines or 
territories that have become states.ts (Congress could, of course, 
still adopt laws under other powers that applied in Puerto Rico, 
just as federal laws adopted under the commerce power, for ex-
ample, have effect throughout the states.) 
Despite some early lower court opinions (and dicta in more 
recent cases) suggesting that Commonwealth has fundamentally 
altered congressional power under the Territory Clause,t6 the 
Supreme Court and the Executive Branch have rejected the ar-
gument.17 Interestingly, both statehood supporters and in-
66 Stat. at 327. 
15. Supporters of this view point to language in the preamble of the Puerto Rican 
Constitution, which provides: "We, the people of Puerto Rico ... do ordain and establish 
this Constitution for the commonwealth which, in the exercise of our natural rights, we 
now create within our union with the United States of America." P.R. Const. pmbl. See 
also P.R. Const. art. I, § 1 ("The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is hereby constituted. Its 
political power emanates from the people and shall be exercised in accordance with their 
will, within the terms of the compact agreed upon between the people of Puerto Rico and 
the United States of America."); Col6n, 19 Revista del Colegio de Abogados de Puerto 
Rico at 238-58 (cited in note 2). Consider id. at 254: "The legal status of the Common-
wealth ... [rests] on the sovereignty of the people of Puerto Rico. They created it, they 
empowered it, they made it sovereign .... Congress surrendered those powers which had 
traditionally been exercised by the territory of Puerto Rico." ld. at 254. 
16. See Figueroa v. Puerto Rico, 232 F.2d 615, 620 (1st Cir. 1956); Mora v. Mejias, 
206 F.2d 377, 382 (1st Cir. 1953). Consider this dicta in United States v. Quinones, 758 
F.2d 40, 42 (1st Cir. 1985): 
Thus, in 1952, Puerto Rico ceased being a territory of the United States subject 
to the plenary powers of Congress as provided in the Federal Constitution. The 
authority exercised by the federal government emanated thereafter from the 
compact itself. Under the compact between the people of Puerto Rico and the 
United States, Congress cannot amend the Puerto Rico Constitution unilater-
ally, and the government of Puerto Rico is no longer a federal government 
agency exercising delegated power. 
See generally Leibowitz, Defining Status at 165-85 (cited in note 6). 
17. Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651-52 (1980) (per curiam); Political Status of 
Puerto Rico, 1991: Hearings on S. 244 Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural 
Resources, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 193-94 (1991) (statement of Hon. Richard Thornburgh, 
Attorney General); Cabranes, 110 F.R.D. at 483 n.26 (cited in note 1); Peter J. Fliess, 
Puerto Rico's Political Status Under Its New Constitution, 5 W. Pol. Q. 635,643 n.29 (1952) 
(concerning position of government lawyers during commonwealth process); id. at 644 
(concluding that "[t]here can be little question that Congress' legal powers under the 
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dependentistas have argued that Congress lost nothing by 
authorizing Puerto Rican self-rule: from either perspective, the 
conclusion that congressional power has not been limited by 
Commonwealth supports a move to a legal status that would 
clearly terminate "plenary power" -either statehood or indepen-
dence.ts But to conclude that Congress has not alienated its 
power under the Territory Clause is not to conclude that that 
power is plenary in the sense of unlimited. Two sorts of limits are 
conceivable. First, it might be argued that Congress may not dis-
criminate against Puerto Ricans simply on the basis of residence 
in the Commonwealth. Second, the Bill of Rights and other ex-
plicit limits on congressional power might apply to federal regu-
lation of Puerto Rico. 
United States Constitution and Section 9 of the Organic Act are tantamount to unilateral 
authority over future mainland-island relations"). 
For lower court decisions to the same effect, see United States v. Sanchez, 992 F.2d 
1143, 1148-49 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. Rivera Torrez, 826 F.2d 151, 154 (1st Cir. 
1987); Perez de Ia Cruz v. Crowley Towing and Transp. Co., 807 F.2d 1084, 1088 (1st Cir. 
1986). See also United States v. Lopez Andino, 831 F.2d 1164, 1173 (1st Cir. 1987) (Tor-
ruella, J ., concurring): 
[T]he legislative history of [P.L. 600]Ieaves no doubt that even though its pas-
sage signaled the grant of internal self-government to Puerto Rico, no change 
was intended by Congress or Puerto Rico authorities in the territory's constitu-
tional status or in Congress' continuing plenary power over Puerto Rico pursu-
ant to the Territory Clause of the Constitution. (emphasis in original). 
See generally David M. Helfeld, How Much of the United States Constitution and Statutes 
Are Applicable to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico?, 110 F.R.D. 452 (1985) ("Helfeld 
/"); David M. Helfeld, Congressional Intent and Attitude Toward Public Law 600 and the 
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 21 Revista Juridica de Ia Universidad 
de Puerto Rico [Rev. Jur. U.P.R.] 255 (1952) ("Helfeld If'). 
Although Commonwealth status is not deemed to have affected congressional power, 
the Court views the establishment of Commonwealth as rendering Puerto Rico more 
"statelike." See Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 
426 U.S. 572,594 (1976) ("the purpose of Congress in the 1950 and 1952Iegislation was to 
accord to Puerto Rico the degree of autonomy and independence normally associated 
with States of the Union."). This characterization may carry weight in matters of statu-
tory interpretation. E.g., Calera-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 670-
76 (1974) (statutes of Puerto Rico are "state statutes" for purposes of invoking three-
judge court). 
18. See Carlos Romero-Barcelo, Puerto Rico, U.S.A.: The Case for Statehood, For-
eign Aff. 60-61 (Fall 1980); Ruben Berrios Martinez, Independence for Puerto Rico: The 
Only Solution, Foreign Aff. 566-67 (Apr. 1977). 
It should be stressed that Congress has, in fact, rarely purported to intervene in local 
self-rule. See United States v. Figueroa Rios, 140 F. Supp. 376, 380-81 (D.P.R. 1956) (fed-
eral statute criminalizing transporting of firearm by person convicted of crime of violence 
in interstate commerce or within territory held not to apply to intra-Puerto Rico transpor-
tion). Most statutes that have an effect in Puerto Rico are exercises of other delegated 
powers. (For a counter-example, see Helfeld I at 467 n.67 (cited in note 17).) 
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For most federal regulatory and criminal statutes, Puerto 
Rico is treated as if it were a state.19 There are, however, some 
important exceptions. First, individuals and corporations in Pu-
erto Rico pay no federal income taxes (although this permits Pu-
erto Rico to set local taxes at significantly higher levels ).2o 
Second, residents of Puerto Rico receive less favorable treatment 
than mainland residents under a number of major federal bene-
fits programs. For citizens of Puerto Rico, federal payments 
under Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Medicaid, and 
the food-stamps program are made at lower levels and are sub-
ject to an overall cap.21 The Supplemental Security Income Pro-
gram (aid to the aged, blind, and disabled) does not apply to 
Puerto Rico; rather, through continuation of an earlier, similar 
program, benefit levels for Puerto Ricans are capped and made 
at lower levels than SSI payments made to eligible persons resid-
ing in the states.ZZ According to a 1990 study by the Congres-
sional Budget Office, treating Puerto Rico as a state under these 
programs would have increased federal transfers to the Com-
monwealth by some $1.7 billion in fiscal year 1992, rising to al-
most $3 billion in fiscal year 1995.23 It is also generally agreed 
that, because of high levels of poverty on the island and a low 
average income,24 the dollars lost due to unfavorable treatment 
19. General Accounting Office, Pub. No. GAO/HRD-89-104FS, Puerto Rico: Up-
date of Selected Information Contained in a 1981 GAO Report (1989), reprinted in 3 Pu-
erto Rico Political Status Referendum 213, 246-61 (Appendix III) (1992) ("Political Status 
Referendum") (examining thirty major federal statutes in the areas of income support, 
health care, taxes, immigration, labor, environment, and trade); Helfeld I, 110 F.R.D. at 
460 (cited in note 17). 
20. David L. Brumbaugh, Puerto Rico's Status Options and Federal Taxes (Congres-
sional Research Sevice, 1990), reprinted in 2 Political Status Referendum at 211, 214 (cited 
in note 19) ("(i]n a very general sense ... the effect of Federal and Puerto Rican tax laws 
is to substitute Puerto Rico's own income tax for the Federal"). 
21. The federal government funds between 50% and 83% of each state's AFDC 
program, depending on the state's per capita income. For Puerto Rico, the federal share 
is fixed at 75%, with a cap on total funding. Puerto Rico is excluded completely from the 
federal food stamp program. It receives instead a separate grant, capped in advance by 
Congress. Funding for Medicaid is also capped. S. Rep. No. 481, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 10-
11 (1990). 
22. Id. at 10. 
23. Potential Economic Impacts of Changes in Puerto Rico's Status Under S. 712 
(Congressional Budget Office, 1990), reprinted in 2 Political Status Referendum 1, 23 
(1992) (cited in note 19). 
24. According to 1990 Census data, per capita income in Puerto Rico was $4,177, 
compared to a national average of $14,420. The figure for Mississippi, the state with the 
lowest per capita income, is $9,648. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 1990 Census of Population 
and Housing, Summary Social, Economic, and Housing Characteristics: Puerto Rico, 1990 
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under the federal benefit programs substantially exceed the dol-
lars lost to the U.S. Treasury because of the tax exemption on 
Puerto Rican taxpayers.25 
The Supreme Court has given short shrift to claims that the 
disadvantageous treatment of Puerto Rico violates the Fifth 
Amendment's equal protection guarantee. In Harris v. Rosa-
rio,z6 the Court upheld the disparate treatment of Puerto Ricans 
under ADFC in a page and a half per curiam opinion issued 
without full briefing or oral argument. The summary disposition, 
joined by six members of the Court, stated that under the Terri-
tory Clause Congress "may treat Puerto Rico differently from 
States so long as there is a rational basis for its actions."21 Refer-
ring to an earlier per curiam opinion upholding the exclusion of 
Puerto Rico from the federal Supplemental Security Income pro-
gram,28 the Court identified three grounds for concluding that 
the differential treatment of Puerto Rico was rational: "Puerto 
Rican residents do not contribute to the federal treasury; the cost 
of treating Puerto Rico as a State under the statute would be 
high; and greater benefits could disrupt the Puerto Rican 
economy. "29 
Harris is a startling and troubling example of the Court's un-
willingness to give any serious scrutiny-indeed, any serious 
thought-to congressional exercises of power over the territo-
ries. The Court's summary treatment of the complex issues is no 
doubt aided by its general unwillingness to scrutinize federal wel-
fare programs.Jo But the reasons assigned by the Court for find-
ing the statute rational (which are simply lifted verbatim from an 
earlier case and would seem to authorize virtually any discimina-
tion against Puerto Rico residents in federal programs) suggest 
CPH-5-53, at 191 (Feb. 1993); U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 1990 Census of Population and 
Housing, Summary Socia~ Economic, and Housing Characteristics: United States, 1990 
CPH-5-1, at 228 (Nov. 1992). 
25. Carolyn L. Merck, Welfare and Taxes Under Alternative Status Options for Pu-
erto Rico, (Congressional Research Service, 1991), reprinted in 2 Political Status Referen-
dum 291, 302-03 (cited in note 19). (This figure does not include gains to the federal 
budget that would accrue from statehood due to the repeal of tax credits to mainland 
corporations doing business in Puerto Rico.) 
26. 446 U.S. 651 (1980), reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 912 (1980). 
27. 446 U.S. at 651-52. 
28. 446 U.S. at 652 (citing Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978) (per curiam)). 
29. ld. 
30. Cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), reh'g denied, 398 U.S. 914 (1970) 
(upholding regulation capping AFDC payment regardless of family size). The Court has 
made exceptions where a protected class is involved. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 
U.S. 199 (1977) (gender); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (illegitimacy); Gra-
ham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (aliens). 
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that something else is at work other than the Court's usual hostil-
ity to constitutional claims brought by poor people. 
The Court is surely correct that residents of Puerto Rico pay 
no federal income tax and that funding Puerto Rico at the level 
of the states would cost the federal treasury more. Moreover, it 
is certainly arguable that higher welfare payments "could disrupt 
the Puerto Rican economy." To this extent, the arguments sup-
plied in support of the statute are rational by not being crazy. 
But the Court's finding of a rational means-end relationship 
is not unassailable. The second and third justifications would 
seem to apply equally to every state, rather than distinguishing 
the Commonwealth from the states: welfare payments cost 
money and may affect local economies by influencing decisions 
to work; and the more AFDC recipients in a state, the higher the 
costs. Yet Congress has not provided for reduced reimbursement 
levels or overall caps for states with large numbers of AFDC re-
cipients.31 Nor does the first justification-that Puerto Ricans 
pay no federal taxes-take us very far.32 The AFDC program 
does not in any way link federal subventions to states to the 
amount that state taxpayers contribute to federal tax coffers. 
And the fact of tax exemption says little about the fairness of 
reduced benefits to island residents, since the would-be taxpayers 
and recipients of federal aid are largely distinct classes of Puerto 
Ricans.33 
Doctrinally, one might expose the thinness of the justifica-
tions through the imposition of a higher level of judicial scrutiny. 
This was Justice Marshall's suggestion in his dissent from the 
31. In 1991, California (with a population a bit more than eight times the size of 
Puerto Rico) had 12 times the number of families receiving AFDC (the average family 
size was the same for both jurisdictions). (Cal.: 729,170; Puerto Rico: 60,842). U.S. Dep't 
of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, Office of Fam-
ily Assistance, Characteristics and Financial Circumstances of AFDC Recipients 19, table 1 
(FY 1991). The federal dollar contributions show a far larger disparity (due to the higher 
level of welfare payments in California). In 1992, the federal contribution to the Califor-
nia AFDC program totalled about $3 billion; federal payments to the Puerto Rican pro-
gram totalled about $63 million. House Ways and Means Committee, 1993 Green Book 
674-75 (1993). 
32. Why might not it be just as reasonable to link welfare participation with service 
in the Armed Forces? Puerto Ricans, as U.S. citizens, have been subject to the draft and 
fought in Operation Desert Storm as part of the volunteer Armed Forces. 
33. Moreover, the tax exemption is not necessarily a windfall to residents of Puerto 
Rico. Because of the lack of a federal income tax, Commonwealth tax rates may be set 
higher. They are currently at about the level that would obtain if the federal income tax 
applied to Puerto Rico. 
Furthermore, the benefits of the federal tax exemption are not limited to island resi-
dents. Mainland corporations have earned millions of dollars of federal tax-free profits 
through operations in Puerto Rico. 
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summary disposition in Harris.34 But it is not clear, under pre-
vailing equal protection doctrine, how heightened scrutiny might 
be triggered. Rather, Harris exposes a deeper issue. Even as-
suming that the justifications provided by Congress are "ra-
tional" (as we understand that term in constitutional analysis), 
what is not explained is why they are permissible. The distinction 
drawn by Congress is one based simply on residence in a terri-
tory; it is grounded, when all is said and done, not on different 
facts, but on status of place.3s If Congress were truly interested 
in saving money or not unduly interfering in local economies, it 
could draft legislation accomplishing those ends with classifica-
tions that do not distinguish territories from states. Furthermore, 
it is curious that under federal welfare laws place of residence 
should count for more than citizenship: permanent resident aliens 
residing in the states receive the same level of payments as U.S. 
citizens residing there; U.S. citizen residents of Puerto Rico do 
not. 
In short, the "reasoning" of Harris is that Puerto Rico is not 
a state, and that Congress is entitled to draw lines between terri-
tories and states in the disbursement of federal funds. But con-
stitutional law ought to demand more than judgment by 
definition. It seems to me that some set of justifications beyond 
those currently indulged in by the Court are demanded when 
Congress acts to disadvantage a class of the poorest American 
citizens who, by place of residence, are not entitled to participate 
in the federal political system.36 
B. THE SuBSTANTIVE CoNSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS oF 
PuERTO RICANS 
The Insular Cases focused national attention on the question 
of the constitutional status of the territories. Although there was 
little doubt that Congress possessed broad power to establish 
governments for the new acquisitions, a question sparking heated 
political and legal controversy was whether the residents of the 
new "possessions" were entitled to the protections of the federal 
Constitution. Some argued that direct application of the Consti-
34. 446 U.S. at 654 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
35. And we should not lose track of the obvious "Footnote 4" point that residents of 
Puerto Rico cannot vote in presidential elections or elect members of Congress. 
36. This raises the interesting question whether the federal tax exemption enjoyed 
by Puerto Ricans should be constitutionally suspect-a topic omitted from most commen-
taries criticizing the Court's conceptualization of the constitutional status of Puerto Rico. 
Favorable treatment may well be problematic, unless it is justified as some form of a 
remedy for colonial treatment and absence of political rights. 
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tution would needlessly hinder congressional flexibility in carry-
ing out the Empire project. Others thought that the Constitution 
must apply wherever the federal government acts-in the phrase 
of the day, "the Constitution followed the flag."37 Interestingly, 
this latter claim was sometimes pressed by anti-imperialists, not 
with the intent of ensuring that Filipinos or Puerto Ricans in fact 
possessed U.S. constitutional rights, but rather to put obstacles in 
the way of Empire. Few Americans thought that the residents in 
the newly acquired territories were "civilized" enough to partici-
pate in American political institutions. Thus, a conclusion that 
they were entitled to full constitutional protections (and perhaps 
representation in Congress) would provide Congress with a 
strong incentive to cast off the territories.3s 
In the Insular Cases, the Court compromised. Unwilling to 
throw water on the imperialist fires burning in the nation, the 
Court ensured that the Constitution would not be read to unduly 
limit congressional options.39 The doctrinal innovation here was 
the newly minted distinction between "incorporated" and "unin-
37. It is usually forgotten that one of our most famous constitutional aphorisms 
arises from the controversies of this time. In full, Mr. Dooley's observation was: "no 
matter whether th' constitution follows th' flag or not, th' supreme coort follows th' ilec-
tion returns." Finley Peter Dunne, Mr. Dooley's Opinions 26 (Harper & Brothers, 1906). 
To the dismay of its advocates, the idea that the Constitution applied in the territo-
ries echoed Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott-an irony of which members of the 
Court were painfully aware. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287-92 (1901) (White, 
Shiras, and McKenna, JJ., concurring). 
38. See Hon. Jose A. Cabranes, Pueno Rico: Colonialism as Constitutional Doctrine, 
100 Harv. L. Rev. 450, 455 (1986) (book review). 
39. This view is stated most directly by Justice Brown's opinion in Downes v. Bid-
well. Because the language is extraordinarily revealing, I quote it at length: 
Patriotic and intelligent men may differ widely as to the desireableness of this or 
that acquisition, but this is solely a political question. We can only consider this 
aspect of the case so far as to say that no construction of the Constitution should 
be adopted which would prevent Congress from considering each case upon its 
merits, unless the language of the instrument imperatively demand it. A false 
step at this time might be fatal to the development of what Chief Justice Mar-
shall called the American Empire. Choice in some cases, the natural gravitation 
of small bodies towards large ones in others, the result of a successful war in still 
others, may bring about conditions which would render the annexation of dis-
tant possessions desirable. If those possessions are inhabited by alien races, dif-
fering from us in religion, customs, laws, methods of taxation and modes of 
thought, the administration of government and justice, according to Anglo-
Saxon principles, may for a time be impossible; and the question at once arises 
whether large concessions ought not to be made for a time, that, ultimately, our 
own theories may be carried out, and the blessings of a free government under 
the Constitution extended to them. We decline to hold that there is anything in 
the Constitution to forbid such action. 
182 U.S. 244, 286-87 (1901). The kind of language used here is similar to other plenary 
power cases of the day involving federal regulation of Indians and aliens. See T. Alexan-
der Aleinikoff, Semblances of Sovereignty: The Constitution, the State, and American Citi-
zenship (unpublished manuscript). 
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corporated" territories. For those territories "incorporated" into 
the United States by congressional and executive branch action 
and deemed to be on the road to statehood (such as Alaska), the 
Constitution applied in full. "Unincorporated" territories, such 
as Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines, faced different con-
stitutional rules. In the possessions, the Constitution was "opera-
tive," but this did not mean that every provision was 
"applicable."40 For example, because unincorporated territories 
were held not to be a part of the United States in a constitutional 
sense, the requirement that taxes "be uniform throughout the 
United States"4t did not apply. More important, residents of the 
"unincorporated" territories were guaranteed only those rights 
held by the Court to be "fundamental."42 This latter rule held 
whether or not the territorial population had been granted U.S. 
citizenship. 43 
The Insular Cases concluded that Puerto Rico was not an 
"incorporated" territory of the United States, a holding that lasts 
to this day. Accordingly, application of the Bill of Rights to the 
laws governing the island was not automatic, as made clear by 
Chief Justice Taft's opinion for a unanimous Court in Balzac v. 
Porto Rico.44 In Balzac, a newspaper editor was charged with 
criminal libel, a misdemeanor under Puerto Rican law. The is-
land's code of criminal procedure did not provide for jury trial in 
such cases, and Balzac claimed that the law violated his rights 
under the Sixth Amendment. Taft concluded that, absent evi-
dence of clear congressional intent, the Court would not hold 
that Puerto Rico had been incorporated into the United States; 
accordingly, the Sixth Amendment did not automatically apply 
to criminal proceedings in Puerto Rico. And under the particu-
lar circumstances of the territory, application of the jury right 
would be inappropriate: 
The jury system needs citizens trained to the exercise of 
the responsibilities of jurors. In common-law countries centu-
ries of tradition have prepared a conception of the impartial 
40. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 292 (1901) (White, J., concurring), adopted by 
the Court in Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904), and Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 
298 (1922). The Court thus rejected polar positions urged in the course of the debate over 
the status of the territories: (1) that it was fully up to Congress to determine which rights 
would be extended to the territories, and (2) that the Constitution applies in full wherever 
the government of the United States acts. For a detailed description and analysis of these 
arguments, see Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 Yale LJ. 909 (1991). 
41. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
42. Dorr, 195 U.S. at 146. 
43. Balzac, 258 U.S. at 308-10. 
44. 258 u.s. 298 (1922). 
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attitude jurors must assume. The jury system postulates a con-
scious duty of participation in the machinery of justice which it 
is hard for people not brought up in fundamentally popular 
government at once to acquire. One of its greatest benefits is 
in the security it gives the people that they, as jurors actual or 
possible, being part of the judicial system of the country can 
prevent its arbitrary use or abuse. Congress has thought that a 
people like the Filipinos or the Porto Ricans, trained to a com-
plete judicial system which knows no juries, living in compact 
and ancient communities, with definitely formed customs and 
political conceptions, should be permitted themselves to deter-
mine how far they wish to adopt this institution of Anglo-
Saxon origin, and when.45 
27 
Balzac is a curious decision for a number of reasons. First, 
the Court's holding was not affected by the fact that citizens of 
Puerto Rico had been granted U.S. citizenship in 1917. Argua-
bly, the earlier cases might have been distinguished on such a 
ground; or, the granting of citizenship might have suggested that 
Puerto Rico had been "incorporated" into the United States.46 
Second, Puerto Rican legislation had provided for a jury trial in 
felony cases since 1901.47 Thus, the subtext of the opinion-that 
Puerto Ricans were not prepared to operate Anglo-Saxon insti-
tutions-appears weak.48 Finally, because Puerto Ricans were 
citizens of the United States, they could freely travel to the main-
land and be called to serve on juries in the state or federal 
courts-despite being "trained to a complete judicial system that 
knows no juries." 
45. Id. at 310. Would Taft's reasoning support exclusion of naturalized U.S. citizens 
from juries if they grew up in legal systems without juries? 
46. "[U]nder the circumstances," wrote the Chief Justice, "[U.S. citizenship is] en-
tirely consistent with non-incorporation." The granting of citizenship ensured Puerto Ri-
cans the protection of a sovereign, but it did not automatically demonstrate a 
congressional intent to incorporate the territory. Id. at 308. 
47. See Juan R. Torruella, The Supreme Court and Puerto Rico: The Doctrine of 
Separate and Unequal99-100 (Editorial de Ia Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1985). 
48. Taft's words here appear carefully chosen. He seems unwilling to join the gener-
ally held opinion of the day that Puerto Ricans simply were not "civilized" enough to 
understand or operate under Anglo-Saxon traditions. (Other Justices in the Insular Cases 
were less restrained. See, e.g., Downes, 182 U.S. at 279-80: ("[l]t is doubtful if Congress 
would ever assent to the annexation of territory upon the condition that its inhabitants, 
however foreign they may be to our habits, traditions and modes of life, shall become at 
once citizens of the United States.").) Rather, Taft sounds a note of deference in Balzac 
to local decisionmakers, which helps him conclude that the availability of jury trials for 
felonies is not determinative. 
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Although Balzac has never been overturned,49 it is of little 
consequence today. By statute, Puerto Ricans enjoy a right to 
jury trial in both Commonwealth and federal prosecutions con-
sistent with prevailing constitutional rules.so In addition, by a 
process that approximates incorporation of the Bill of Rights 
through the Fourteenth Amendment against the states, the Court 
has consistently concluded that the protections of the Bill of 
Rights apply to the territories.st In recent cases, the Court has 
analyzed Firstsz and Fourth Amendments3 claims in cases arising 
in the Commonwealth just as it would if the case had challenged 
conduct of one of the fifty states. 
The Insular Cases, then, held forth the possibility that resi-
dents (including U.S. citizens) in the possessions would enjoy a 
lesser degree of constitutional protection than citizens (and per-
manent resident aliens!)s4 in the states. But both by statute and 
by judicial expansion of the notion of "fundamental rights" that 
apply in "unincorporated" territories, the Bill of Rights applies 
with full force in the Commonwealth.ss 
A deeper puzzle remains, however. The Insular Cases con-
cerned constitutional limits on federal powers. How is it, then, 
that the Constitution applies to acts of the Commonwealth gov-
ernment? Prior to Commonwealth, it could be argued that the 
acts of the Puerto Rican government constituted federal action in 
a federal territory; hence, constitutional norms limiting federal 
action could be imposed on the conduct of the island's officials. 
49. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1957) (opinion of Black, J.); Torres v. Puerto 
Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 475-76 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring) (suggesting that Insular Cases 
represent the views of an earlier age). 
50. P.R. Const. art. II, § 11. For explanation of the statutory background, see 
Helfeld I at 458 (cited in note 17). Not all territories, however, are bound by the jury trial 
right. Compare King v. Andrus, 452 F. Supp. 11 (D. D.C. 1977) (Sixth Amendment jury 
trial right applies in American Samoa) with Northern Mariana Islands v. Atalig, 723 F.2d 
682 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1244 (1984) (jury trial not required as matter of 
federal constitutional law). 
51. See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986) 
(First Amendment); Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1 (1982) (voting 
rights); Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979) (Fourth Amendment); Examining Bd. 
of Eng'rs, Architects, and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 599-601 (1976) 
(equal protection). 
52. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 339. 
53. Torres, 442 U.S. at 470-71. 
54. See Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 652 (1980). There is an interesting analogy 
here to the Court's treatment of aliens in the United States. Resident aliens are entitled 
to the individual constitutional rights guaranteed citizens, but Congress has broad author-
ity to exclude them from benefit programs made available to citizens. 
55. Of course, some significant gaps in protection remain: residents of Puerto Rico 
do not participate in federal elections and, as described above, suffer unfavorable treat-
ment under federal benefit programs. 
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But, as a number of lower court cases have suggested, the coming 
of Commonwealth seems to undermine the position that the Pu-
erto Rican government may be viewed as exercising federal 
power.s6 Nor is it clear how the Bill of Rights could be brought 
to bear against the Puerto Rican government by virtue of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which ap-
plies only to the actions of a "state."s7 (And to conclude that 
Puerto Rico is a "state" within the terms of the Due Process 
Clause would be difficult to square with the Amendment's subse-
quent references to "states" regarding representation in 
Congress.) 
The Supreme Court has been unwilling to designate the 
route by which constitutional norms bind the Commonwealth 
government. In Examining Board v. Flores de Otero,ss for exam-
ple, it held unconstitutional a Puerto Rican statute establishing a 
citizenship requirement for the private practice of civil engineer-
ing. Although the Court applied the constitutional standards by 
which state discrimination against aliens is judged, it studiously 
avoided deciding from whence the equal protection norm came: 
It is clear now ... that the protections accorded by either the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Due Pro-
cess and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment apply to residents of Puerto Rico .... 
The Court, however, thus far has declined to say whether 
it is the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth which provides 
the protection .... Once again, we need not resolve that pre-
56. Figueroa v. Puerto Rico, 232 F.2d 615 (1st Cir. 1956) (Puerto Rican Constitution 
is not an act of Congress); Mora v. Torres, 113 F. Supp. 309 (D. P.R. 1953) (Fifth Amend-
ment no longer applicable to acts of Puerto Rican government; "The [Puerto Rican] gov-
ernment is no longer an agency of the Government of the United States nor does it 
exercise any longer its powers by way of delegation of the Federal Government."). Cf. 
United States v. Lopez Andino, 831 F.2d 1164 (1st Cir. 1987) ("dual sovereignty" doctrine 
applies to criminal prosecutions by Puerto Rico; no double jeopardy problem). But see 
United States v. Sanchez, 992 F.2d 1143, 1150 (11th Cir. 1993) ("Punitive authority in a 
territory of the United States flows directly from this plenary power. Every exercise of 
authority which does not proceed under a direct Congressional enactment proceeds, at 
least, at the sufferance of the Congress, which may override disfavored rules or institu-
tions at will. The United States Congress is the source of prosecutorial authority for ... 
the courts of United States territories.") (footnote omitted). 
57. The Supreme Court has, at times, been willing to conclude that Puerto Rico 
constitutes a "state" under a particular federal statute. E.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson 
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 670-76 (1974) (Puerto Rico constitutes "state" for pur-
poses of three-judge court statute). But see Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co., 400 U.S. 41 (1970) 
(Puerto Rican statute not a "state statute" within 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (permitting appeals 
from federal courts of appeals' decisions holding state statutes unconstitutional)). 
58. 426 U.S. 572 (1976). 
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cise question because, irrespective of which Amendment ap-
plies, the statutory restriction ... is plainly unconstitutional.59 
This reasoning begs the question more than it seems to real-
ize. The issue is not whether the statute could be sustained under 
any equal protection norm; the question is why any equal protec-
tion norm applies at all.60 
One answer may be provided by positive law. Under the 
Organic Act of 1917, Congress applied most of the Bill of Rights 
to the acts of the coloniallegislature.6t (The most significant ex-
ceptions, it should not surprise, were the constitutional grand 
jury and petit jury protections.) Section 2 of the Act declared 
that "no law shall be enacted in Puerto Rico which shall ... deny 
to any person therein the equal protection of the laws."62 
The 1950 legislation initiating the Commonwealth process 
specifically mandated that any constitution drafted by Puerto 
Rico "shall include a bill of rights";63 and the bill of rights subse-
quently included in the 1952 Constitution includes all the federal 
guarantees that apply to the states64 (and more6s). Again, equal 
protection receives explicit mention.66 Finally, the congressional 
legislation approving the Constitution required the Common-
wealth to amend the Constitution to include a guarantee that 
subsequent amendments be "consistent . . . with the applicable 
provisions of the Constitution of the United States."67 As ex-
plained by the Senate Report: 
59. ld. at 600-01. 
60. Justice Rehnquist's dissent makes this point with concise clarity. ld. at 606-09. 
He also raises an additional intriguing question: if the equal protection norm comes by 
way of the Fifth Amendment's limits on federal power, why cannot Puerto Rico assert the 
broad federal power to draw lines between citizens and aliens. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 
426 U.S. 67 (1976); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976). 
61. Act of March 2, 1917, Pub. L. No. 368, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951. 
62. 39 Stat. at 951. 
63. Public Law 600 § 2 (cited in note 11). 
64. See P.R. Const. art. II. 
65. E.g. id. § 7 (prohibiting the death penalty); id § 8 ("Every person has the right to 
the protection of law against abusive attacks on his honor, reputation and private or fam-
ily life."); id § 10 (prohibiting wiretapping). Section 19, in looking two ways at once, 
shows an acute awareness of U.S. constitutional development: 
The foregoing enumeration of rights shall not be construed restrictively nor does 
it contemplate the exclusion of other rights not specifically mentioned which 
belong to the people in a democracy. The power of the Legislative Assembly to 
enact laws for the protection of life, health and general welfare of the people 
shall likewise not be construed restrictively. 
ld. § 19. 
66. Section 7 provides: "No person in Puerto Rico shall be denied the equal protec-
tion of the laws." ld. § 7. 
67. Act of July 3, 1952, ch. 567,66 Stat. 327 (1952). The Puerto Rican Constitutional 
Convention formally accepted the congressionally mandated amendment to the Constitu-
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Applicable provisions of the United States Constitution 
and the Federal Relations Act will have the same effect as the 
Constitution of the United States has with respect to State 
Constitutions or State laws .... Any act of the Puerto Rican 
Legislature in conflict with ... the Constitution of the United 
States or United States laws not locally inapplicable would be 
null and void. 
Within this framework,the people of Puerto Rico will ex-
ercise self-government. As regards local matters, the sphere 
of action and the methods of government bear a resemblance 
to that of any State of the Union.68 
31 
This legislative history provides a rather firm foundation for con-
cluding that acts of the Puerto Rican government are subject to 
federal constitutional strictures. Indeed, can it be possible that in 
recognizing Commonwealth status in 1952 Congress sought to 
abandon the constitutional limits applicable to the Puerto Rican 
government prior to that time? 
The legal materials, however, might be viewed as taking us 
only half the way. The requirement that the Puerto Rican Con-
stitution include a Bill of Rights might be described as internal-
izing federal constitutional norms; that is, the federal norms 
might become rules for the Commonwealth under Puerto Rican 
law. Accordingly, such norms would not be enforceable in fed-
eral court as a matter of federal law-much as state constitu-
tional provisions, even if they mirror federal guarantees, are not 
subject to federal enforcement. But this interpretation runs 
counter to the express congressional statements in the 1952 stat-
ute and its supporting legislative history that acts of the Puerto 
Rican legislature and amendments to the Constitution comport 
with the federal Constitution's standards-just as state acts and 
constitutions must. 
In short, the positivist response to why the federal Constitu-
tion applies to the acts of the Puerto Rican government is be-
cause Congress, in exercise of its unsurrendered plenary power 
to regulate the territories, has said so. But it seems unsatisfac-
tory to stop here. The Court has not relied on this reasoning in 
its steadfast refusal to ascertain the source of constitutional limits 
on Puerto Rico. Indeed, its hazy language seems to point to 
something in the constitutional atmosphere, to principles lying 
tion's amending provision. It is interesting that the congressional proviso demands adher-
ence to "applicable provisions of the Constitution"-suggesting continued fidelity to the 
principle of the Insular Cases that not all constitutional rights automatically apply in Pu-
erto Rico. 
68. S. Rep. 1720, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952). 
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above and behind our pen-on-paper texts.69 Thus the Court has 
quoted favorably First Circuit Chief Judge Magruder's conclu-
sion in an early case after Commonwealth that it is not necessary 
to determine whether it is the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment or of the Fourteenth Amendment that applies to 
Puerto Rico: the important point is that "there cannot exist 
under the American flag any governmental authority untram-
meled by the requirements of due process of law as guaranteed 
by the Constitution of the United States."7o 
The declaration here echoes the famous non-argument (but 
inescapable conclusion) of Bolling v. Sharpe.7l And it suggests 
something quite telling about our constitutional system. Consti-
tutional norms may be free-floating not only in the sense that 
they are not rooted in a text, but also in the sense that they pro-
vide background principles for the entire system. The textual 
mentions of equal protection or due process become merely local 
instantiations of systemic norms. 
The one major stumbling block to the theory-leaving aside 
the usual litany of complaints against non-textualism-is that the 
Court's statement is incorrect. There in fact exists "under the 
American flag [a] governmental authority" not constrained by 
the federal Constitution: Indian tribes. In the 1896 case of Talton 
v. Mayes, the Court held that: 
[T]he existence of the right in Congress to regulate the man-
ner in which the local powers of the Cherokee nation shall be 
exercised does not render such local powers Federal powers 
arising from and created by the Constitution of the United 
States. It follows that as the powers of local self government 
enjoyed by the Cherokee nation existed prior to the Constitu-
tion, they are not operated upon by the Fifth Amendment, 
which, as we have said, had for its sole object to control the 
powers conferred by the Constitution on the National 
Government.72 
The holding of Talton has been undercut by the 1968 enact-
ment of the "Indian Bill of Rights," which extends most of the 
federal Bill of Rights-again pursuant to federal "plenary 
69. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (Court unwilling to ascribe source 
of right to travel to particular constitutional provision). 
70. Calera-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 669 n.5 (1974), quot-
ing Mora v. Mejias, 206 F.2d 377, 382 (1st Cir. 1953). 
71. 347 u.s. 497 (1954). 
72. 163 u.s 376, 384 (1896). 
1994] PUERTO RICO 33 
power" over Native Americans-to tribal govemments.73 But 
the case has not been overturned. Arguably, Talton can be dis-
tinguished, if the Court wishes to conceptualize the tribes as 
political bodies approximating foreign nations while considering 
Puerto Rico a quasi- (or proto-) state. But the Court's recent 
cases on the powers of Indian tribes seem to cut precisely in the 
other direction, threatening to erode a century of doctrine ac-
cording weight to inherent tribal sovereignty.74 
Can Talton and Flores de Otero logically coexist in our con-
stitutional system? Does Talton suggest broader possibilities for 
Puerto Rican self-rule than is usually assumed? Does Flores de 
Otero put pressure on century-old assumptions about the appli-
cability of the Constitution to Native American tribal govern-
ments? Whether a unified theory of sovereignty under the 
Constitution can be worked out remains to be seen.7s But these 
generally ignored comers of constitutional law may provide far 
more fertile ground for theoretical work than has been hereto-
fore appreciated. 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ENHANCED 
COMMONWEALTH STATUS 
Frequently labeled "colonialism by consent," the 1952 Com-
monwealth solution to the status question has satisfied few. The 
advocates of statehood and independence argue that Puerto Ri-
can self-determination cannot be fully realized while federal ple-
nary power exists. Although some Commonwealth proponents 
have maintained that Commonwealth status terminated Con-
gress' plenary power, the argument seems a loser.76 Accordingly, 
the Commonwealthers over the years have supported various 
proposals to increase Puerto Rican autonomy vis-a-vis the fed-
eral govemment.77 These "enhanced Commonwealth" plans run 
73. Act of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II, § 202, 82 Stat. 77, as amended 
by Act of October 27, 1986, Pub. L. 99-570, tit. IV,§ 4217, 100 Stat. 3207-146 (codified at 
25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988)). The Act did not extend the guarantees of the Establishment 
Clause or grand jury indictment. 
74. E.g., Duro v. Reina, 110 S. Ct. 2053 (1990); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and 
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989). See Joseph William Singer, 
Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 (1991). 
75. I am currently at work on a book-length treatment of these issues. See 
Aleinikoff, Semblances of Sovereignty (cited in note 39). 
76. But see Leibowitz, Defining Status at 172 (cited in note 6) (legislative history 
may be read to establish "an irrevocable grant of authority in local affairs with an under-
standing of mutual consent being required before Congress would resolve the ultimate 
status question or change the status of the Commonwealth"). 
77. A noteworthy study, issued in 1975, was conducted by the Ad Hoc Advisory 
Group on Puerto Rico appointed by the President of the United States and the Governor 
34 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 11:15 
from the powerful (declaring an end to federal plenary power, 
granting Puerto Rico a veto over the application of federal laws 
to the island, and authorizing a vote in Presidential elections and 
representation in Congress) to the supplemental (requiring a 
"clear statement" by Congress that general legislation is to apply 
to Puerto Rico). 
Legislation introduced in the 102nd Congress provided a 
fairly mild version of "Commonwealth-plus" status. S. 244 au-
thorized a referendum on status and spelled out the three options 
in some detail (raising interesting questions about how a ballot 
simply listing the status options could accurately inform the elec-
torate of the consequences of their vote). Regarding a new Com-
monwealth status, the bill declared: 
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is a unique juridical sta-
tus, created as a compact between the People of Puerto Rico 
and the United States, under which Puerto Rico enjoys sover-
eignty, like a State, to the extent provided by the Tenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and in addition 
with autonomy consistent with its character, culture and loca-
tion. This relationship is permanent unless revoked by mutual 
consent.78 
The legislation would have strengthened Puerto Rico's hand 
in federal decisionmaking regarding the Commonwealth in sev-
eral respects. It provided that, should the legislature of Puerto 
Rico pass a resolution recommending that a particular federal 
law no longer apply to Puerto Rico, the recommendation could 
be adopted by a joint resolution of the Congress.79 In addition, it 
of Puerto Rico. Charged with submitting recommendations on how to "develop the max-
imum of self-government and self-determination within the framework of Common-
wealth," the Group proposed a new compact "of permanent union" which would have, 
inter alia, (1) ended disfavorable treatment of Puerto Rican residents in federal benefit 
programs (§ 6); (2) granted Puerto Rico some degree of control over immigration to the 
island(§ 10); (3) provided for a Puerto Rican delegate in the U.S. Senate(§ 11); (4) pro-
vided that future federal laws would not apply in Puerto Rico unless a statute specifically 
referred to the island; and such laws, when objected to by Puerto Rico as inconsistent 
with Compact, must be essential to the interests of the United States (§ 12); (5) author-
ized amendments to the Compact only upon the mutual consent of both parties (§ 21). 
Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Puerto Rico, Compact of Permanent Union between Puerto 
Rico and the United States (October 1975). 
The enhanced commonwealth proposal at issue in the recent plebiscites included four 
measures: restoring and making permanent favorable federal tax treatment of corporate 
profits earned in Puerto Rico, extending SSI to the island, removing the cap on food 
assistance funds, and protecting Puerto Rican agriculture through federal tariffs. Robert 
Friedman, PDP expected to move cautiously in D.C., San Juan Star, Nov. 15, 1993, at 9. 
78. S. 244, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 401(a) (1991). 
79. S. 244, § 403(a). Exempted from the procedures of the bill were statutes relating 
to citizenship, foreign relations, defense or national security, or legislative matters under 
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mandated that federal agencies promulgating regulations pay ap-
propriate respect to the special status of Puerto Rico and to re-
spond specifically to objections raised by the Governor of Puerto 
Rico that a proposed regulation is inconsistent with that status.so 
The bill also included a number of other minor "enhancements," 
including provisions aimed at increasing federal consultation 
with the Commonwealth on matters of interest to Puerto Rico 
and bringing Puerto Rican participation in federal benefit pro-
grams closer in line with that of the states.s1 
The legislation did not purport to provide the Common-
wealth with a veto over the application of federal law to the is-
land. Nor did it permit Puerto Rican constitutional guarantees to 
trump federal statutes.s2 It did not conceptualize Common-
wealth as a status with more autonomy from federal intervention 
than states enjoy. The thrust of the legislation was, in effect, to 
make Puerto Rican home rule similar to that of the States of the 
Union (including a guarantee-currently applicable to the 
States-that that status could not change without consent of the 
People of Puerto Rico). Arguably, the provisions requiring Con-
gress and the federal agencies to take notice of Puerto Rican 
claims that federal law impinged on Commonwealth status put 
Puerto Rico in a favored position vis-a-vis the states. But these 
measures may also be viewed as modest attempts to remedy what 
states have but Puerto Rico does not: representation in Congress 
and votes in the electoral college.sJ 
the jurisdiction of the Senate Committees on Finance (i.e., tax legislation) and Agricul-
ture, Nutrition and Forestry. S. 244, § 403(c). 
80. The agency had to respond by finding (a) that it had no discretion not to make 
the rule applicable to Puerto Rico; (b) that the national interest demanded that the rule 
apply; or (c) that the rule was not consistent with Commonwealth status and therefore 
should not apply. S. 244, § 404. 
81. These included: § 403(d) (authorizing Governor of Puerto Rico to enter into 
international agreements "as authorized by the President of the United States and consis-
tent with the laws and international obligations of the United States"); § 405 (federal 
Department of Transportation to seek advice of Commonwealth when negotiating air 
transportation agreements that would affect air traffic to or from Puerto Rico); §§ 407, 
415 (aiming at parity for Puerto Rico under federal benefits programs); § 408 (requiring 
federal officials to consult with the Commonwealth on appointments to federal positions 
in Puerto Rico); § 411 (entitling "community values" by exempting from antitrust laws 
agreements by Puerto Rican broadcasters to develop guidelines to "alleviate the negative 
impact" of violence, drugs, and sexually explicit material on television). 
82. Cf. United States v. Quinones, 758 F.2d 40 (1st Cir. 1985) (federal statute author-
izing wiretapping permits introduction of wiretap evidence in federal prosecution in Pu-
erto Rico, despite provision in Puerto Rico Constitution prohibiting wiretaps). 
83. If Congress were to accept the Commonwealth's suggestion that a particular 
federal law not apply to the island, then it could be seen as giving the Commonwealth 
preferred treatment (and not simply establishing Puerto Rican parity with the states). For 
example, it has sometimes been argued that federal environmental standards might be 
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It is thus somewhat surprising that the Attorney General of 
the United States told Congress that the "enhanced Common-
wealth" status established by S. 244 was unconstitutional.84 Tes-
tifying before the Senate in 1991, Attorney General Thornburgh 
stated that the legislation's provisions declaring (a) that Puerto 
Rico "enjoys sovereignty, like a State, to the extent provided by 
the Tenth Amendment," and (b) that the relationship could only 
be revoked "by mutual consent," were "totally inconsistent with 
the Constitution." He elaborated as follows: 
Under the Territory Clause of the Constitution ... an 
area within the sovereignty of the United States that is not 
included in a State must necessarily be governed by or under 
the authority of Congress. Congress cannot escape this consti-
tutional command by extending to Puerto Rico the provisions 
of the Tenth Amendment, which by its terms provides only 
[for] the relationship between the Federal Government and 
states. 
We also doubt that Congress may effectively limit, by a 
statutory mutual consent requirement, its constitutional power 
under the Territory Clause to alter Puerto Rico's status in 
some respect in the future. Not even the so-called "enhanced 
commonwealth" can ever hope to be outside of this constitu-
tional provision.ss 
The Attorney General offered little support for his rather 
wooden interpretation of the Territory Clause, a reading that 
conflicted with an opinion of the Department of Justice issued by 
an earlier Republican administration concluding that Congress 
relaxed in Puerto Rico so as not to hinder economic development. But, under S. 244, this 
would be a federal decision, not the exercise of a power to "opt out" by Puerto Rico. 
84. Others have wondered whether the Republican Party's official support for state-
hood colored its constitutional conclusions regarding "enhanced Commonwealth." See 
Puerto Rico Self-Determination Act, 1990: Hearings on H.R. 4765 Before the Subcomm. on 
Insular and Int'l Affairs of the House Comm on Interior and Insular Affairs, lOlst Cong., 
2d Sess. pt. 2, 112-17 (1990) (statement of Jaime B. Fuster, Delegate from Puerto Rico). 
85. Pueno Rico Status Referendum Act, 1991: Hearings on S. 244 Before the Senate 
Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 190 (1991) (statement of 
Richard Thornburgh, Attorney General) ("Hearings on S. 244"). In section-by-section 
comments attached to the Attorney General's testimony, the Department of Justice also 
objected to the power granted the Governor of Puerto Rico to force reconsideration of 
federal regulations. It argued that such action would constitute "significant governmental 
authority under the laws of the United States" and therefore could be carried out only by 
a federal official appointed under the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. Id. at 
212 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126-41 (1976)). It also opined that the require-
ment that the President consult with the Puerto Rican government before appointing 
federal officials in Puerto Rico would be an unconstitional intrusion upon the President's 
appointment power. Id. at 213. 
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had the power to enter into an irrevocable compact.s6 And it is 
somewhat peculiar to see the Executive Branch more concerned 
about protecting congressional prerogatives than the Congress.s1 
The Attorney General's reasoning seems to be this: the 
United States Constitution knows only the mutually exclusive 
categories of "State" and "Territory"; States are full and equal 
members of the Union, but Territories are subject to plenary fed-
eral power; such plenary power may be surrendered only by 
moving outside the Territory Clause by granting statehood or in-
dependence; to recognize congressional power to create new cat-
egories-like enhanced Commonwealth-violates the structure 
of the Constitution and potentially weakens the position of the 
States (if a Commonwealth can be granted powers not available 
to States).ss 
But the Territory Clause provides no blueprint for territorial 
government. In perfectly plain language, it empowers Congress 
to make "all needful Rules and Regulations." John Marshall de-
scribed this power in the broadest terms: under the Territory 
Clause, "we find Congress possessing and exercising the absolute 
and undisputed power of governing and legislating for the [terri-
tories]."s9 There may well be structural limits on this broad 
power. For example, I assume it would be unconstitutional for 
Congress to give territories voting representation in the Senate. 
But nothing in "enhanced Commonwealth" threatens the power 
of the states. Congressional practice in the creation and regula-
tion of territories is populated with novel arrangements. The in-
famous Insular Cases recognized the need for congressional 
flexibility in handling the unanticipated situation of Empire. 
When that flexibility is now, by mutual consent of metropole and 
86. Letter of A. Mitchell McConnell, Jr., Acting Assistant Attorney General for 
Legislative Affairs, to Marlow W. Cook, Co-Chairman, Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Pu-
erto Rico, May 12, 1975. The section-by-section analysis of the Justice Department sub-
mitted with Attorney General Thornburgh's testimony stated that the earlier opinion of 
the Department was "subject to serious question." Hearings on S. 244 at 211 (cited in 
note 85). 
87. Perhaps such vigilance might be explained as protecting future Congresses from 
the current Congress. 
88. There is an interesting analogy here to constitutional norms regarding congres-
sional regulation of aliens. States, like citizens, are full and equal members of the U.S. 
polity; aliens, like territories, are not members, and are subject to plenary congressional 
power. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 
Const. Comm. 9 (1990). 
89. Sere and Lara/de v. Pitot, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332, 337 (1810). 
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colony, exercised to restore dignity and self-government, why 
should congressional power suddenly be read narrowly?90 
The Attorney General's answer to the question is oblique. 
It is that the territory power may not be alienated. Or, to put the 
point in the form of an old constitutional chestnut, a sitting Con-
gress may not bind a future Congress.91 But, of course, this is 
hardly an absolute rule. Neither the granting of statehood nor 
independence may be revoked; nor may land grants or other 
"vested interests" be called back by a subsequent Congress.92 
To my mind, it is not the "inalienability" point that is really 
doing the theoretical work in the Attorney General's testimony. 
Rather it is an undisclosed and unanalyzed set of assumptions 
about the nature of sovereignty. We have inherited constitu-
tional understandings of sovereignty that demand neat boxes and 
hierarchies. To be a sovereign nation means to exercise full and 
final authority over a piece of territory-authority that may not 
be challenged from without or within. Were it otherwise, the na-
tion would run the risk of anarchy or external domination.93 In 
this tidy nineteenth century conceptual world,94 there is no room 
for "enhanced" Commonwealth if it bestows a form of sover-
eignty that takes away from congressional plenary power. 
Is this notion of sovereignty appropriate for our late twenti-
eth century world? In an insightful recent essay, Neil Mac-
Cormick examines strongly expressed concerns in the United 
Kingdom that membership in the European community threat-
ens traditional conceptions of Parliamentary sovereignty.9s "A 
different view," he suggests, "would be that sovereignty and sov-
ereign states, and the inexorable linkage of law with sovereignty 
and the state, have been but the passing phenomena of a few 
centuries, that their passing is by no means regrettable, and that 
90. Cf. Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308 (1937) (upholding transfer 
to the Philippine Treasury of federal taxes collected on coconut oil produced in the Philip-
pines; Court recognizes broad congressional power to structure territorial relations as it 
deems appropriate). 
91. Even if the Attorney General is correct on this point as a matter of law, it does 
not follow that it is wrong for Congress to state its commitment not to alter Puerto Rican 
status without the consent of the people of Puerto Rico. Such a congressional commit-
ment would have strong moral and political force, and would not likely be ignored by a 
subsequent Congress, whether or not it is legally binding. 
92. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137 (1803). 
93. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) for the domestic claim; the Chinese Ex-
clusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), for the foreign claim. 
94. But see Aleinikoff, Semblances of Sovereignty (cited in note 39) (suggesting cat-
egories were not, in fact, so neat). 
95. Neil MacCorrnick, Beyond the Sovereign State, 56 Mod. L. Rev. 1 (1993). 
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current developments in Europe exhibit the possibility of going 
beyond all that."96 MacCormick argues "it seems obvious" that 
today no state in Western Europe is, in a classical sense, sover-
eign; "[n]one is in a position such that all the power exercised 
internally in it, whether politically or legally, derives from purely 
internal sources."97 But to say that no state is sovereign is not to 
say that there must therefore be a sovereign super-state (such as 
the European .Community): 
We must not envisage sovereignty as the object of some kind 
of zero sum game, such that the moment X loses it Y necessar-
ily has it. Let us think of it rather more as of virginity, which 
can in at least some circumstances be lost to the general satis-
faction without anybody else gaining it.98 
The challenge is to imagine a world in which "our normative 
existence and our practical life" exist in various institutional sys-
tems, "each of which has validity or operation in relation to some 
range of concerns, none of which is absolute over all the others, 
and all of which, for most purposes, can operate without serious 
mutual conflict in areas of overlap."99 
Consideration of the status of Puerto Rico brings these is-
sues stateside. If, as MacCormick argues, "from a jurisprudential 
point of view, there is no compulsion to regard 'sovereignty,' or 
even hierarchical relationships of superordination and subordina-
tion, as necessary to our understanding of legal order,''loo the 
question is whether we can think ourselves into notions of sover-
eignty that permit overlapping and flexible arrangements attuned 
to the complex demands of enhanced autonomy within a broader 
regulative system of generally applicable constitutional norms. 
Under the "enhanced Commonwealth" of S. 244, Congress may 
have lost a bit of its sovereignty (although certainly less than it 
loses whenever it admits a State to the Union); but Puerto Rico 
did not thereby become "sovereign" over the United States. 
96. ld. at 1. 
97. Id. at 16. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 17. 
100. Id at 10. MacCorrnick elaborates: 
To escape the idea that all law must originate in a single power source, like 
a sovereign, is thus to discover the possibility of taking a broader, more diffuse, 
view of law. The alternative approach is system-oriented in the sense that it 
stresses the kind of normative system law is, rather than some particular or ex-
clusive set of power relations as fundamental to the nature of law. It is a view of 
la:W that allows of the possibility that different systems can overlap and interact, 
Without necessanly requiring that one be subordinate or hierarchically inferior 
to the other or to some third system. 
ld. at 8 (footnote omitted). 
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Federal law would still be supreme over Puerto Rican law, and 
the U.S. Constitution would remain supreme over both. The 
only significant change in sovereign relations would be that 
amendment of the compact establishing Commonwealth would 
require consent of both parties. 
MacCormick acknowledges that successful practical applica-
tion of his understanding of sovereignty would "depend on a high 
degree of relatively willing co-operation and a relatively low de-
gree of coercion in its direct and naked forms."tot These back-
ground conditions appear satisfied in the case of Puerto Rico. 
There are strong economic links between the island and the 
mainland (approximately 40% of Puerto Ricans live in the 
states), and travel between the states and the Commonwealth is 
unfettered. Enhanced Commonwealth, should it come to pass, 
would be established with the consent of both Congress and the 
people of Puerto Rico and would operate within a larger legal 
culture of shared constitutional values. 
A new understanding of sovereignty-as overlapping rather 
than hierarchical, as lost but not necessarily found-may appear 
to be precisely the wrong move in a world currently being torn 
apart by violent assertions of self-determination and nationalism. 
Yet it is rarely recognized that it is largely the older understand-
ings of sovereignty (and not more "post-modern" conceptions) 
that are contributing to instability and bloodshed. "Nations" are 
demanding "states"; "states" are fighting for more territory over 
which to exercise "sovereignty." It may in fact be arrangements 
that finesse the issue of sovereignty that present the best chance 
for peace (the "autonomy" granted the Palestinians in Gaza and 
Jericho being only the most recent example). If both the Con-
gress and the people of Puerto Rico seek to establish a new rela-
tionship that recognizes space within the American constitutional 
system for "autonomous" entities, it ill behooves either the Exec-
utive Branch or the Judiciary to now call a halt to plenary power 
in the name of nineteenth century conceptions of sovereignty. 
CONCLUSION 
"'Colonialism,'" writes federal district judge Jose Cabranes, 
"is a harsh word to American ears."wz It is also a word that 
seems anachronistic. With the end of empire in Africa several 
decades ago and in the Soviet Union several years ago, claims of 
101. ld. at 17. 
102. Cabranes, 110 F.R.D. at 481 (cited in note 1). 
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self-determination more frequently involve dissolution of mul-
tinational states than the liberation of a homeland from a distant 
and alien power. Yet, according to Cabranes, "no word other 
than 'colonialism' adequately describes the relationship between 
a powerful metropolitan state and an impoverished overseas de-
pendency disenfranchised from the formal lawmaking processes 
that shape its people's daily lives."to3 
Decolonization is both a political and economic process. It 
is also a symbolic process. Supporters of each of the three status 
options, though they define it differently, all seek a more perfect 
realization of dignidad for the people of Puerto Rico.t04 
It has been the independence movement that has pushed the 
"decolonization" claim with the most vigor and conviction.tos 
But in the recent plebescite, the independence option garnered 
103. Id. at 480. 
104. See Berrios Martinez, Foreign Aff. at 583 (Apr. 1977) (cited in note 18) ("Our 
people cannot live without freedom and dignity. Independence is the only solution."); 
Political Status of Puerto Rico, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natu-
ral Resources, IOist Cong., 1st Sess. pt I at 171 (1989) (statement of Hon. Rafael Her-
nandez Colon, Governor of Puerto Rico) (enhanced Commonwealth "will go a long way 
towards updating what was a brilliant solution to the dilemma of a people seeking their 
place in dignity within the American constitutional system-a people unwilling to give up 
their identity and culture.")); Romero-Barcelo, Foreign Aff. at 81 (Fall 1980) (cited in 
note 18) (advocating statehood: "A people's quest for dignity is nearing its goal. ... The 
goal of the Puerto Rican people is political equality within a framework which will permit 
our island and our nation to prosper together."). 
105. Independence supporters have made yearly trips to the United Nations, arguing 
that Puerto Rico remains a colony and that international pressure should be brought to 
bear on the United States for decolonization. Following establishment of the Common-
wealth, the United Nations-at the request of the United States-removed Puerto Rico 
from the list of non-self-governing territories. G.A. Res. 748, U.N. GAOR, 8th Sess., 
Supp. No. 17, at 25-26, U.N. Doc. A/64 (1953). The resolution removed the requirement 
that the United States report to the United Nations on conditions on the territory and 
efforts being taken to promote self-government. In 1972, the United Nations Decoloniza-
tion Committee (officially, the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the 
Implementation of the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Coun-
tries and People) put the Puerto Rican question on its agenda and has continued discus-
sion of the island's status up to the present. The Committee has regularly adopted 
resolutions "[reaffirming] the inalienable right of the people of Puerto Rico to self-deter-
mination and independence." In 1993, the Committee appeared to be ready to close up 
shop. It has, however, put over the Puerto Rico question for another year. United Na-
tions, Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Dec-
laration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples [hereinafter 
Decolonization Committee]; Verbatim Record of the 1424th Meeting at 50, U.N. Doc. AI 
AC.I09/PV.l424 (Aug. 15, 1993) (unedited transcript). Pro-decolonization groups have 
asked the Committee to recommend to the General Assembly that it seek an opinion 
from the International Court of Justice defining the status of Puerto Rico under interna-
tional law. Decolonization Committee, supra; Verbatim Record of the 1422nd Meeting at 
28, U.N. Doc. A/AC.l09/PV.l422 (Aug. 9, 1993) (statement of Puerto Rican Bar 
Association). 
42 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 11:15 
little support.t06 More than 90% of those who voted expressed a 
preference for some kind of continued association with the 
United States. The fact of the plebescite itself weakens the in-
dependentista claim, to the extent the vote represents an exercise 
of the right of self-determination for which the movement 
stands.to7 
Advocates of statehood promise to push forward, despite 
the results of the recent plebescite. Commonwealth proponents 
scored points in the referendum debate by arguing that state-
hood would require abandonment of cultural distinctiveness. In-
deed, as part of their campaign, the commonwealthers solicited 
and broadcast statements of conservative Republican members 
of Congress suggesting that it would be difficult to obtain con-
gressional approval of statehood if Puerto Rico sought to "come 
in the Union with two official languages."tos The statehood 
forces were quick to challenge these assertions, knowing that 
maintenance of Spanish is both a practical necessity and a non-
negotiable aspect of cultural self-determination for the people of 
Puerto Rico.Hl9 While the prospects of statehood appear 
dimmed for the present (surely Congress will not take up the 
cause in light of the plebescite results), the argument for equality 
implicit in the statehood drive will not disappear. Should sup-
port for statehood attain majority status in years ahead, it will 
force the nation to confront directly deep questions of assimila-
106. That the independence option received only 4.4% of the vote in the plebescite 
did not stop Independence Party President Ruben Berrios from calling the result "the 
biggest triumph for the independence movement in the last forty years." According to 
Berrios, it was the independence vote that prevented either commonwealth or statehood 
from attaining majority support: "Now, neither of the two defeated parties can speak in 
the name of the island," he told supporters in a post-referendum rally. Jennifer McKim, 
Berrios claims victory for independence, San Juan Star, Nov. 15, 1993, at 14. 
107. Independence supporters have attempted to answer this argument by asserting 
that that the referendum cannot constitute a genuine act of self-determination because 
(1) some two million Puerto Rican nationals living on the mainland were not allowed to 
participate while non-nationals living on the island were permitted to vote; (2) its results 
are not binding on the Congress; (3) it took place within a context of that subverted free 
exercise of the right of self-determination, namely the exercise of U.S. authority and the 
presence of the U.S. military in Puerto Rico; and (4) by including the Commonwealth 
option, the plebescite did not guarantee an end to colonialism. Decolonization Commit-
tee, supra note 99, NAC.1091PV.1422, at 23-24 (Aug. 9, 1993) (statement of Puerto Rican 
Bar Association). 
108. Robert Friedman, Congressman says Spanish remains barrier for statehood, San 
Juan Star, Oct. 29, 1993, at 14 (quoting Rep. Gerald B. Solomon (R.-N.Y.)). See Robert 
Friedman, N.Y. congressman joins status ad blitz, San Juan Star, Oct. 28, 1993, at 16. 
109. See generally Edgardo Melendez, Colonialism, Citizenship and Contemporary 
Statehood, in E. Melendez and E. Melendez, eds., Colonial Dilemma: Critical Perspectives 
on Contemporary Puerto Rico at 41-52 (cited in note 3) (describing "creole statehood"-
i.e., protection of cultural and linguistic identity of Puerto Rico within the structure of 
U.S. federalism-as dominant conception of statehood movement). 
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tion and multiculturalism. In these times of divisive and deadly 
ethnic nationalism, it would be an important statement for the 
United States to welcome as a full and equal member in the 
Union a polity that cherishes its cultural and linguistic difference 
from the mainland majority. 
Commonwealth, as always, represents a place between state-
hood and independence. It promises, as its supporters claimed in 
the plebescite debate, "the best of both worlds": maintaining 
U.S.-Puerto Rican political bonds while recognizing Puerto Rico 
as a distinct political and cultural society. The narrow victory of 
the "enhanced" commonwealth option in the referendum pro-
vides an opportunity for constitutional scholars to do some seri-
ous thinking about the nature of sovereignty in a world that puts 
pressure on older conceptions of state sovereignty both from 
without and within. 
